Media
Media Manipulation
by Tauel Harper (2025)
In a world shaped by headlines, algorithms, and endless scrolls, who really controls the narrative? Associate Professor Tauel Harper, media scholar at Murdoch University, joins Kurt Krispyn to unpack the complex intersections of democracy, persuasion, and misinformation. From political spin and media ownership to social media’s sway over truth and trust, they explore how our beliefs are shaped, and how we can sharpen our critical thinking in an age of constant noise. A thought-provoking conversation on free speech, manipulation, and the power of genuine understanding, a reminder that meaningful change starts with awareness.
Link to videocast: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_lng_avlWmc
Who’s responsible for extreme beliefs?
by Anne Schwenkenbecher (2025)
On ABC Radio National: The Philosopher’s Zone
It’s easy to say that people who hold extreme antisocial beliefs should be held responsible for those beliefs. But in fact, many extremists operate within what philosophers call impoverished epistemic environments – epistemic “bubbles” and echo chambers whose inhabitants might be ignorant of the truth, or subject to manipulation. But does that mean responsibility for extreme beliefs therefore lies with the wider public? And if so, what are we to do about it?
Guest: Anne Schwenkenbecher, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Academic Chair of Philosophy, Murdoch University WA
Producer: David Rutledge
Links to podcast: https://www.abc.net.au/listen/programs/philosopherszone/who-s-responsible-for-extreme-beliefs-/105663456
Social media platforms and their influence on society and politics
by Tauel Harper (2025)
Mark sits down with Dr Tauel Harper, Associate Professor with the School of Media and Communication at Murdoch University. We discuss the impact of social media platforms on public discourse and democracy, platforms use of algorithms in big data mining for media preferences, amplifying the “tyranny of the majority”.
The conversation also touched upon the spread of misinformation on social media platforms, comparing it to the spread of viruses but emphasizing that extreme claims and emotive content travel faster than evidence-based opposition or engagement with real people.
Tauel discussed his 2011 book “Democracy in the Age of New Media: Politics of the Spectacle,” which delves into the failure of democracy due to the inability of citizens to critically interrogate how democracy functions.
The post Dr Tauel Harper – social media platforms and their influence on society and politics appeared first on Technogaze.
Link to podcast: https://joy.org.au/technogaze/2025/02/dr-tauel-harper-social-media-platforms-and-their-influence-on-society-and-politics/
Democracy and Artificial Intelligence:
Current practices and visions into the future
by Nardine Alnemr, Rob Weymouth and Brian Sullivan (2024)
Deliberative Democracy Digest
What potential does artificial intelligence have for supporting deliberative democracy? In the second of this two-part series, Nardine Alnemr and Rob Weymouth are joined by software developer Brian Sullivan to think through what roles might be appropriate for AI in deliberative democracy, and what the implications are in practice. Read the first part of this series here.
Link to podcast: https://www.publicdeliberation.net/democracy-and-artificial-intelligence-current-practices-and-visions-into-the-future/
Collective inaction and group-based ignorance
by Anne Schwenkenbecher (2018)
Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics Series, Oxford University
In this St Cross Special Ethics Seminar, Anne Schwenkenbecher discusses morally wrongful collective inaction and the problem of group-based ignorance.
Some of the many things that we could do together with others but fail to do are morally wrongful inactions. While the list of our – individual and collective – non-actions is infinite, not everything that I (or we) fail to do is some form of inaction that is plausibly attributable to me (or us). ‘Collective inaction’ is the unintended failure of two or more agents to perform a collective action or produce a joint outcome where that action or outcome was collectively feasible and where the individual agents had group-based reasons to perform (or produce) it. In a second step we will discuss the role that ignorance plays in excusing morally wrongful collective inaction. We identify three different kinds of collective knowledge (common, pooled, or public) and corresponding types of group-based ignorance. We conclude by showing that inaction is excusable where ignorance sufficiently weakens agents’ group-based reasons for action.
Download the audio file here: https://media.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/uehiro/HT18_STX_Schwenkenbecher.mp3